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I

Reviews
THE

QUAKERS

AS TYPE

OF THE

SPIRIT-CENTERED

by William P. Roberts. Catholic
and Quaker Studies, 1110 Wildwood Ave., Man
asquari, N. J. 181 ,
00 paperback.
6
pp,$

COMMUNITY,

What may prove to he a major event in Quaker publica
tion and should be of much interest to the readers of this
periodical is the appearance of the first of what is intended to
be a series of publications designated “Catholic and Quaker
Studies.” The committee undertaking this task consists of the
author of the work here being reviewed, a Jesuit who prepared
it as a doctoral dissertation at Marquette University, two other
Catholic scholars and three Quakers, namely, Maurice Creasey,
Lewis Benson, and Dean Freiday.
Roberts declares that his purposes in writing this thesis
are two. Since one of the aims expressed in the recent Vatican
Council meetings was that Catholics should study the thought
and practices of non-Catholic Christian communities, he intends
to do just that by showing that “Quakers are in a striking
way truly represantative of the Spirit-centered, community.”
Secondly, he exhibits “important parallels” between Catholi
cism and some of the thought and practices of Friends.
in criticizing the work I wish, first, to recognize the spirit
of outreach and cooperation in which it is written and the
genuine effort which its author put forth to understand and
appreciate Quakerism. Such a work by a Catholic thinker
would have been quite impossible a score or less of years ago!
it is not “objective,” in the sense of being non-partisan, for it
is of course written from the Roman Catholic viewpoint. As
a doctoral tbesis it has its limitations. It is praiseworthy for
what it has accomplished; it is of considerable value as an intro
duction to Quaker history, teaching, principles and practices,
especially for those unfamiliar with the Society of Friends. Yet
from a Quaker standpoint it contains partial understandings at
certain places. I will mention some points of negative criticism
below and end with a general observation.
A. The only primary materials on early Quakerism used
by Roberts are those taken from Fox and Barclay, the latter’s
Apology in an old, undated edition which should have been
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replaced by the fresh, excellent edition of Dean Freiday. Bar
clay is himself treated as a Quaker authority, which of course
he is not. A quotation almost unknown in Quaker circles,
taken from his The Anarchy of the Ranters, is presented to
show that Quakers, like Catholics, believe the church (meeting)
to have authority to pronounce judgments which are obligatory
on all its members.
B. The first chapter presents a sketch of the so-called “rad
ical Reformation” and describes in some tletail the Anabaptists
as a main branch of that movement. The supposition to be
made is that in doing this Roberts intends to demonstrate that
Quakerisin arose from this side of the Reformation and from
the Anabaptist movement. Unhappily, however, he fails to
trace the actual relationship! Fox himself is presented as a
seeker receiving “important insights” from time to time, which
jell into a unified pattern at Pendle Hill. I feel this to be an
unconvincing explanation of the origins of a gi-eat movement,
especially because the connections between Fox’s own experi
ences and thought and the radical Reformation, Anabaptists,
and radical Puritanism are not provided.
C. The second chapter, which attempts to establish paral
lAs between Catholic and Quaker ideas, I find of slight value
to the thesis, if one were to ask some Friends what parallels
they would find, the answer might well be given in terms of
Catholic mysticism, especially that of the Middle Ages. Rather
oddly, since Roberts is discussing the “Spirit-centered com
munity,” he seems to find no similarity at this point, for he does
not once mention such! instead he refers to the Canonists and
the Conciliarists as providing parallels, not primarily of the
Spirit-centereclness of all three but, rather, of their views of
church government! ‘This appears to be a strange point at
which to find the stipposed parallelism! Even on this matter
the differences are greater than the similarities.
I). Roberts makes the statement that George Fox is “not a
theologian,” and goes on to state that Fox “possesses the gift of
the Spirit bui is an unlettered man whose approach to theology
is disorganized and unscientific” (p. 12). it is true that Fox
does not, like Barclay, “treat specific doctrinal topics at gm-eat
length, nor in orderly sequence.” Yet, leaving aside the ques
tion of what Roberts might mean by “scientific” theology, we
must disagree with his judgment on Fox if he means by it that
Fox lacked a consistent body of religious understanding. It can
he said with validity that Fox was not a theologian in the same
sense that Jesus and Paul were not theologians!
39

F. Roberts discusses views of Quakerism held by modern
Friends. As one recalls the lack of agreement on what consti
tutes Quakerism among contemporary Quakers he may well ask
whether any generalizations are possible, without much discus
sion and qualification! Further, with oniy two exceptions,
Roberts makes no reference to the important contributions
made by Quaker Religious Thought in which our best recent
religious thought is to be found, and he fails also to mention
the writing of such Friends as Lewis Benson, Maurice Creasey,
and Douglas Steere.
y fundamental and therefore vital issues between
111
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Catholics anti Quakers, as Roberts sees them, are described in
a brief appendix entitled “Prospects for Christian Unity.”
Friend.s may not be surprised to discover that for Roberts the
greatest sources of conflict between Catholics and Friends are
those ol theology and church governance. The “crucial issue,”
lie states, is that of the Trinity
“whether the Quakers see the
Father, the risen Christ and the Spirit as three distinct persons
who are united as one divine being, or whether they view
Christ and the Spirit as merely two different manifestations of
the one divine person, the Father.” “A clear answer to this
problem, he continues, “is of vital importance in any serious
attempt to reach mutual understanding
A closely related problem, for Roberts, is that of the way
in which the “work of Christ” is understood. He states that
Catholics hold an “incarnational” iew of redemption according
to which the Son took on human flesh, passed into risen life,
and now gives his Spirit to us, partly through the seven sacra
ments. Friends, he asserts, deny special sacraments anti make
sanctification the result of “the working of the Holy Spirit in
us anti our response to Him.” This view, he believes, implies
that there is no necessity for the risen Christ to give the Spirit
to us through the sacraments. Further, Roberts indicates that
Quakers hold a radically different view of the priesthood and
reject both the hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic
church and the liturgical aspects of Catholic worship which
centers in the Eucharist.
Of course Roberts is correct that these differences in belief
and form exist, some of them between Catholics and all Prot
estants. The deeper problem between us is not explicitly stated,
I think, namely that Friends believe or believed that George
Fox proclaimed a new Gospel for his day which arose out of
his own experiences
a new Gospel which was the original
Gospel of Christ himself, a “new beginning on a new founda
—
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tion” as Lewis Benson recently described the situation. Fox
was not primarily a moral reformer nor an ecclesiastical
i ;iormer, says Benson, although both moral anti ecclesiastical
reform grew out of his teaching and labor. The “revolutionary
conception of Christ” held by Fox, that “Christ has come to
teach his people himself,” included a unique understanding of
the meaning and way of “salvation,” different from that of
either Catholics or Protestants. Fox had delved beneath the
theoligical “notions” anti nearly dead forms to the living, spin
tual loot of Christianity which carries life anti power.
If it is inshtcd, 1w Roberts or others, that in order for
Friends to coiiie into worthwhile discussions with Catholics
they must give up those insights, experiences, and interpreta
tions whic:h are peculiarly their own, then it is being implied
that cooperation between Catholics and Quakers is possible
only as Friends surrender their genius and become, in effect,
Catholics! In other words, the entire Reformation was a
mistake, and Quakers with it! And if this is what Roberts is
suggesting (anti I am not sure it is) then the attempt to find
bases of cooperation may well be abandoned.
I do not, however, believe that this needs to be said. One
fintls in the Catholic church today a most intense desire to pene
trate below the words anti forms, just as Fox wished to plunge
beneath theni to the real life of Christianity. I consider such
con temporary theologians as E. Schillebeeckx, Hans Kfing, Karl
Ralmet anti Hans von Baithasar to be examples of Catholics
who in much of what they write “sound like Quakers” in their
deepest insights. On their side, some Friends find it possible
to experience spiritual reality in Catholic worship, including
the Mass itself, and find truth for living in Catholic thought anti
forms. What Catholics may discover in living Quakerism was
illustrated some years ago at a conference in which the famous
Cadiolic scholar, the late John Courtney Murray, had lectured
on the inner meaning of the Mass as the way to God. Asked
where Quakers might find a place within his understandings of
Christianity he replied, surprisingly, that the Mass and the
Sacraments exist precisely to do that which Friends seek for in
their silent worship! Tn approaches to each other such as these,
which emphasize not theology and church forms as much as the
movement of life within, Friends and Catholics should have
much to say to each other!
J. Calvin Keene
St. Lawrence University
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REASON, MOI{A[.IrY, AND RELIGION, by Richard S.
Peters (The Swarthmore Lecture). Friends Home
Srvice Committee, London, 1972.
Awe and reason are joined in Richard Peiers’ response to
the conflict in moral decision-making betweeti established
authority and “clomg your own thing.” To overcome this oppo
sition of the “traditional” and “romantic,” Peters turns to an
exploration of our experience. and finds within both general
such as impartiality, respect for persons,
moral principles
and the religious experience of
truth-telling, anti freedom
awe. Emphasized and placed in wider context by religious awe,
these moral principles, in being general, avoid the detailed
codiFication of tradition, and in being principles, avoid the
subjective preference of romanticism.
Peters is to be congratulated for applying philosophical
to our moral and
suspect among many Friends
acumen
religious experience, and finding there both reason and awe
at work. ‘J’o go beyond this dichotomy of objective authority
and subjective preference do we not need, however, a much
more radical exploration of experience than Peters’ rationalism
provides? Is there not an abstractness in this appeal to general
moral principles which withdraws us from the concrete moral
wherein alone this conflict is resolved? Does not
situation
moral experience occur in man’s relation to other men and to
himself within the wider context of the world, and moral reflec
tion involve man in becoming aware of himself in this interrelatedness anti in searching out the responsible act to perform?
To focus on general moral principles is, however, to concern
ourselves more with the accurate delineation of principles than
with the search and self-awareness of persons. When we do
relate to persons (others and myself) secondarily, we do so in
terms of principles we hold, rather than of the full-bodied
persons we are. This subordination of persons to principles is
evident in Peters’ claim that the “predicament of the perplexed”
is less important than “the emergence of general criteria for
assessing people and situations” (p. 11), and that the experi
ence of pleasure, now or later, is less important than “how it
is conceived” (p. 68).
Principles, to be sure, are a significant part of our moral
experience. But we need to go beyond their general dis.
crimination to an exploration both of the diversity of uses of
principle-language in actual moral situations and of the source
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of these principles in the self. To probe to the foundations of
the self will be to discover not only
as Peters rightly remarks
that principles are not consciously chosen, but beyond this,
that they emerge as rational patterns within varying cir
cumstances from the whole complex web of Precognitive or
unconscious commitments. We would find that such tacit
commitments undergird our moral living and language and
orient us in a unique manner of response to persons and our
world. If we can come to a better understanding of the rela
tion of Principles to the precognitive in the lived situation, we
will be in a better position to go beyond the extremes of exter
nally imposed codes and mere subjective preference; we would
understand that the Principles within our moral experience are
not externally imposed but internally emergent, and the pre
cognitive commitments are not mere subjective preferences
but the source of these general principles.
When Peters turns to the religious underpinnings of
moral cxperience, lie considers the much more concretely per
sonal, such as the experience of awe before the inexplicable
and contingent, the experience of worship that provides a con
text in which to express this awe, and of love and hope that
share in the joy and bear the irremediable suffering of the
human predicament. But, as in Kant, the religious is here
subordinated to the moral; the religious does not transform
but merely emphasizes and provides wider scope for the prin
ciples of morality. In fact, the inner light is defined in terms
of the Kantian principle of autonomy, the freedom to adhere
to general moral principles.
We need, however, to understand religion in its own integ
rity. If we were to investigate how awe
the definitive relig
ions phenomenon for Peters
comes to expression in religious
language at work within concrete situations, we would see that
it functions primarily in ways other than underscoring moral
principles. It is not moral principles but faith
curiously
absent from Peters’ deliberations
that religious language
fundamentally expresses. To raise the question of the use of
religious language is to go to the source of our deep-lying trust
or distrust in that awesome mystery that surrounds the world
and founds the self, and is to consider the ongoing transform
ing of our lives through the use
not of concepts character
istic of Peters’ discussion but
of metaphors and images,
parables and stories.
A philosophical investigation will resolve the conflict
between objective authority and subjective preference only if
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it carriez. us b oml a ratiom I morality underscorcd by relig_
iOUs awe to a phenomeriology of our entire moral and religious
life and language, to an exploration of how moral principles
articulate precognitive commitments and how religious lan
exj): esses faith in awesome mystery.
1::
R. Melvin Keiser
Guilford Collcge
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Contributors
Cand Ida Palmer writes: ‘‘As a teenager, when asked by my
Meeting to :a cpt on office for the first time, I stood tp and
told assenibleci Friends that I did not consider my Quaker
views to be sufficiently orthodox; whereupon an older Friend,
crippled with paralysis agitans, struggled to his feet and stated
in a quavering vo;ce, ‘I think it is quite orthodox for Friends
to be unorthodox.’ My Quakerism bas probably come full
tircle since then, for now I’m a most properly orthodox ‘Ortho
dox’ at Fourth and Arch, Philadelphia, where I am a recorded
miniser.’ Between lie a succession of chores and offices and
appoutmcnts and representations for Friends in New Zealand,
anti in Philadelphia, New England and Illinois Yearly Meetings.
She attended the former Friends Schools at Ommen, Hol
land, and X\anganui, New Zealand, and also spent one term at
W’oodbrooe. England. where she married a fellow student,
Vail Palmer of Philadelphia Yearly Meeting. “The Palmers
live n-csenth in a small isolated community, with a college, in
the Appalachian hills of southern Ohio, where Vail teaches
religion and philosophy, and I am the all-purpose housewife
anti laculty rife”
Candida Palmer’s first serious publishing efforts were in trade
journals and grew out of her extensive work in the field of
pharmacy. When her two children were settled in school she
began writing, and eventually publishing, materials for and
about the inner-city child just learning to read, including four
books: Snow Storm Before Christmas, A Ride on High, Kim
Ann and the Yellow Machine and The Soapsuds Fairy. A
booklet of poems and graphics, Sidings, appeared in late 1972.
Canclida Palmer has long been active in the Quaker Theologi
(al Disctission Group and in the leadership of the Conference
of Quaker Writers.

44

p

.

--

